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I study a model of entrepreneurial investment in which investment projects are
heterogeneous with respect to their exposure to an aggregate liquidity shock. A ￿rm
that is a⁄ected by the shock will mitigate its exposure by purchasing claims issued
by a ￿rm that is not. Liabilities of the una⁄ected ￿rm may earn a liquidity premium
due to their fungibility; and, because they are backed by productive investment, their
supply is elastic to the demand. This segmentation implies that an aggregate liquidity
shock has di⁄erent consequences across sectors. The una⁄ected ￿rm plays a role like
that of a bank by supplying liquidity to other ￿rms; this mechanism recalls the ￿real
bills￿doctrine of classical monetary theory.
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11 Introduction
The fact that corporations maintain substantial holdings of liquid securities may be ex-
plained by the existence of a wedge between the cost of internal funds and the cost of
external funds, and the need of these ￿rms to be responsive to investment opportunities
or cost shocks.1 The theoretical foundations for a connection between liquidity and the
e¢ ciency of ￿rms￿investment policies was established in Jensen and Meckling (1976), My-
ers (1977), and Myers and Majluf (1984); and some consequences for the macroeconomy
have been explored by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998, 2001) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997,
2005). The latter groups of authors investigate the e⁄ects of aggregate tightness in the
market for liquid claims on investment by ￿rms that require liquidity to invest e¢ ciently.
These models abstract from consideration of an e⁄ect on the investment of ￿rms positioned
to issue such claims. In this paper, I construct a general equilibrium model of liquidity
constrained investment incorporating a non-trivial endogenous supply of liquid liabilities by
private agents. The theory suggests an important link between the properties of available
investment projects and the distribution of those projects, and the demand and supply in
the market for liquidity. In particular, I show how the liquidity supply function inherits the
elasticity properties of the investment of a certain class of producers. The model also admits
a surprising explanation for liquidation of investment projects in an environment of liquidity
crisis under perfect information.
In Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), liquidity is de￿ned as the
means by which wealth can be stored intertemporally and accessed readily. In each of these
papers, two factors induce a entrepreneur to hold this kind of security. First, moral hazard at
the time of production (in the future) generates the wedge between the private rate of return
to investment and the rate of return demanded by the market. Second, the entrepreneur￿ s
project faces the possibility of a liquidity shock (a cost shock or an random investment
opportunity) at a time when its cash ￿ ow is low. Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) show that a
1See Opler et al. (1999) for empirical evidence on ￿rms￿holdings of liquid securities supporting this view.
2fungible productive asset in ￿xed supply can earn an extra-fundamental ￿liquidity premium￿ ,
a price higher than that consistent with its marginal product, and circulate like money. In
their model, land serves a collateral function in addition to its role as an input to production.
Here the scarcity of land is an exogenous property, and its price is determined endogenously.
In Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998), the liquidity need may be met by a government asset that
is supplied perfectly elastically at a price ￿xed exogenously. They show that the asset may
be demanded even if the price is higher than the fundamental one.
I adopt salient features of the model of Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998) into my model,
but I depart from them by requiring that liquidity be supplied endogenously; there is no
government and no land in my model. Instead, a second producer (whom I call the ￿banker￿ )
is introduced who is capable of issuing securities, backed by his project dividends, that can be
used by the entrepreneur to mitigate his liquidity needs. Notice that the liquid securities are
backed by investment, and to the extent that the banker￿ s investment depends on the market
rate of interest, his issue of liquid liabilities will do so as well. This phenomenon induces
an upward-sloping liquidity supply curve, which contrasts the vertical one in Kiyotaki and
Moore (2005) and the horizontal one in Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998).
Somewhat surprisingly, it is possible for liquidation of the banker￿ s assets to occur in
equilibrium. This is because I assume that the rate of return wedge described above a⁄ects
also the banker, except when the banker terminates his project early. That is, the moral
hazard problem associated with management of the banker￿ s project may be circumvented
by liquidation. Therefore, even though the net return on liquidated investment may be low,
it may be that the banker can promise to pay more to outside stakeholders when his project
is liquidated than when it is allowed to mature. This property engenders an interesting
gambling behavior wherein the banker terminates his investment in a state in which the
liquidity need of the entrepreneur is particularly acute.
With respect to the interpretation of the transactions role of the liabilities of ￿rms, my
model is related also to that of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). They show that riskless
3private liabilities o⁄er transactions services to Diamond-Dybvig-style liquidity traders at an
informational disadvantage with respect to the quality of other securities in the market.
The instruments used in these transactions are interpreted alternatively as corporate debt
or bank deposits. Because the scale of investment projects of ￿rms that issue liquid claims
is ￿xed exogenously, however, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) are unable to investigate the
elasticity of the supply of liquidity in their model.
The position that the supply and availability of private liabilities a⁄ects the allocation of
real resources can be supported empirically. First, it is known that broad measures of money
incorporating interest-bearing private marketable liabilities are more highly correlated with
output than the monetary base or M1.2 This fact led Friedman and Schwartz (1963) to
focus on M2 in their famous study of the connextion between money and the real economy.
Secondly, Friedman and Kuttner (1993) have found that the six-month commercial paper
rate is more informative with respect to movements of output than the rate of interest on the
three-month T-bill, and other researchers have veri￿ed that this ￿nding is quite robust. At a
minimum, this evidence suggests that the liabilities of the government do not determine the
￿nancial environment independent of the positions and capabilities of other participants.
The mechanism for liquidity provision in my paper in the model brings to mind the
￿real bills doctrine￿that private ￿nancial instruments backed by appropriate assets should
be allowed to supplement other media of exchange.3 This doctrine holds that creation and
circulation of notes backed by the proceeds of commerce impart a bene￿cial elasticity to the
supply of liquidity. The present model contributes to the understanding of the elasticity
of the transactions medium by showing how, when contracting frictions exist, a ￿shortage￿
of liabilities suitable for circulation may arise. A scarcity of the transactions medium can-
not exist in the monetary models of Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Champ, Smith and
Williamson (1996), for example, because these models abstract from commitment frictions
that might disqualify certain assets from serving as security for a note.
2See, for example, Cooley and Hansen (1995).
3See Mints (1945) for a discussion of the real bills doctrine in the history of banking theory.
4The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I introduce the formal
model and assumptions. In the third section, I conduct the formal analysis of the model.
The fourth section discusses my ￿ndings. The last section summarizes and concludes.
2 Environment
2.1 Time, Preferences, and Endowments
The economy is inhabited by three agents, whom I label as the banker, the entrepreneur,
and the worker. I index these agents by i 2 fb;e;wg: There are three dates t 2 f0;1;2g:
There is a single good in each period in the economy. The good is useful for consumption
at any date, and the dates 0 and 1 goods are useful also for investment in production projects
as discussed below. The date t good perishes if it is not consumed or invested by the end
of that date. At date 0, the banker and the entrepreneur have endowments !b and !e;
respectively. The worker has no endowment of the good at date 0, and no agent is endowed
with goods at dates 1 or 2.
The worker has an unlimited quantity of labor at dates 0 and 1 that may be converted
one-for-one into the contemporaneous good. Producing goods in this manner has a disutility
for the worker equivalent to one unit of consumption. The worker￿ s labor is inalienable, so
that a promise from the worker to provide labor in the future can be reneged with impunity.4
The banker and the entrepreneur each have a production project that can be used to
produce date 2 goods subject to a pattern of investment of goods at date 0 and 1. Projects
are discussed in detail in the next subsection.
All agents are risk neutral. The banker and the entrepreneur evaluate outcomes according
to the sum of non-negative consumption at the three dates. The worker evaluates outcomes
according to the sum of consumption at each date minus labor expended. At each date,
agents act in order to maximize the expectation of their payo⁄ at the current and future
4I provide a precise mathematical representation for this concept below.
5date(s). Agents do not discount the future.
2.2 Production Projects
Production in the economy is a⁄ected by the realization of a random variable that is
observed at date 1. The random variable takes on the value H with probability ￿; and L
with probability 1 ￿ ￿: For convenience of notation, I will sometimes write s 2 S = fH;Lg
for a generic outcome, and I write ￿s for the probability that the outcome is s: I will refer to
a pairing of the date and the realization as the state; that is, state 1s indicates date 1 when
the realized outcome outcome is s: Abusing the notation, I may refer to the state at date 0
as ￿state 0￿ .
I ￿rst describe the project of the entrepreneur. At date 0, the entrepreneur chooses
investment level Ie 2 R+: At date 1, the project may need additional investment of goods
in order to continue. Precisely, if the outcome from the random variable at date 1 is H;




s 2 [0;1] is the
fraction of his project that is discontinued in state 1s; and ￿ > 0:5 For simplicity, I assume
that no additional investment is required in state L: Discontinuance or ￿liquidation￿of the
entrepreneur￿ s project yields no residual, so that the fraction that is liquidated is simply
lost. At the beginning of date 2, the entrepreneur has an opportunity to abscond with a
booty of (1 ￿ ￿
e
s)Ie￿e from the project and consume it, in which case he leaves the remnants
of the project valueless. If he chooses rather to allow the project to mature, then it yields
an amount (1 ￿ ￿
e
s)IeRe to be divided according to agreements reached by the entrepreneur
with other agents. Note that the other agents have no recourse against the entrepreneur when
he absconds, but claims against the yield of a project are enforceable once the entrepreneur
has chosen to allow it to mature.
The project available to the banker is similar to that of the entrepreneur, but never
requires additional investment at date 1. At date 0, the banker chooses an investment level
5In order to establish a more generalized and convenient notation, I will sometimes write ￿L := 0 and
￿H := ￿:
6Ib 2 R+: I allow for liquidation of a fraction ￿
b
s 2 [0;1] of the banker￿ s project in state 1s.
Di⁄erent from the entrepreneur￿ s project, there is a positive yield ￿
b
sIbL available from the
liquidated portion of the banker￿ s project in state 1s; where L < 1: Like the entrepreneur, the






Ib￿b at the beginning of date 2, scuttling the
remainder of the project without recourse by other agents. If he chooses instead to allow the






IbRb to be divided according
to any agreement arranged at previous dates.
Assumption 1. I assume (i) that the mature yield of each project is greater than the
private value obtained by the entrepreneur or the banker from absconding, Rj > ￿j for
j 2 fe;bg; and (ii) that the net surplus available from investment in each project is positive
in expectation,
R
e ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 > 0 and R
b ￿ 1 > 0:
2.3 Market Institutions
I assume that, at each date t 2 f0;1g, a competitive market exists for state-contingent
claims to goods at date t + 1: I write q1s for the date 0 price of claims to goods in state 1s;
and I write q2s for the state 1s price of claims to goods in state 2s: I denote the consumption
of agent i in state ￿ by ci
￿; and I denote the net claims to state ts consumption held by agent
i at the end of date t￿1 by Bi
ts: Since the worker￿ s utility depends only on his consumption
net of his labor supply in each period, I will describe his actions only up to this net supply
of labor at dates 0 and 1 denoted x0 := n0 ￿ cw
0 and x1s := n1s ￿ cw
1s, respectively, where n￿
his gross amount of labor supplied in state ￿:
2.3.1 The Worker￿ s Problem
The worker takes present and future claims prices as given, and chooses net claims hold-
ings, and net labor supply to maximize his expected lifetime consumption. The worker￿ s
choices are subject to a sequence of budget constraints, as well as participation constraints
7re￿ ecting the inalienability of his labor. Formulated mathematically, the worker chooses
(x;cw




￿s (￿x1s + c
w
2s): (1)






1s ￿ 0 (2)
￿x1s + q2sB2s ￿ B
w





2s for each s 2 S; (4)
and the participation constraints
￿x1s + c
w
2s ￿ 0 for each s 2 S: (5)
The constraints (2) and (3) require that the net purchases of the worker in the dates 0 and 1
￿nancial markets are no greater than his wealth in the appropriate state. The wealth of the
worker at date 0 is zero, and he a⁄ords ￿nancial asset purchases only by working more than
he consumes. Similarly, his wealth in state 1s is given by his accumulation of assets from the
previous period Bw
1s: The date 2 budget constraints (4) show that the worker consumes no
more in state 2s than a⁄orded by his accumulation of claims Bw
2s: The last set of constraints
(5) re￿ ect the fact that the worker is free to renege on any agreement to provide labor that
does not bene￿t him ex post; this is the mathematical manifestation of inalienable labor.
2.3.2 The Entrepreneur￿ s Problem
The entrepreneur takes claims prices as given and chooses net claims holdings, non-
negative consumption and investment, and a project liquidation rule (ce;Ie;￿
e;Be) to max-





































e (1 ￿ ￿
e
s)R
e for each s 2 S: (9)
The date 0 budget constraint (7) says that the entrepreneur can apply no more than his
endowment to date 0 consumption, investment, and purchase of ￿nancial claims. The date
1 budget constraints (8) say that accumulated claims must be used to fund consumption,
additional investment, and the portfolio to be held at date 2. Finally, (9) says that date 2
consumption must be funded out of accumulated claims and project dividends.
The last budget constraint is valid under the assumption that the entrepreneur does not
abscond with the project dividend. Since the entrepreneur can always achieve consumption of
(1 ￿ ￿
e
s)Ie￿e at date 2 by his choice to abscond, an additional constraint applies to the choice
problem. To see this, suppose that the entrepreneur holds a negative claims position Be
2s <
￿Ie (1 ￿ ￿
e
s)(Re ￿ ￿e) < 0 for some state at date 2. Then (9) implies that ce
2s < (1 ￿ ￿
e
s)Ie￿e;
and the entrepreneur can achieve a higher payo⁄by absconding. Under perfect information,
no creditor would buy a quantity of claims from the entrepreneur that would induce him to
abscond at date 2. Equivalently, it must be the optimal policy of the entrepreneur satis￿es
the incentive compatibility constraints
c
e




e for each s 2 S: (10)
The problem of the entrepreneur may now be stated as that of maximizing (6) subject
9to (7)-(10):
The quantity ~ Re := Re￿￿e, which is positive by Assumption 1, plays an important role in
the analysis to follow. The moral hazard problem described above creates a wedge between
the internal rate of return available to the entrepreneur through investment, and the share
that can be pledged to outsiders. As a result, ~ Re is the marketable share of the entrepreneur￿ s
project, the maximal amount that can credibly be pledged to outside stakeholders per unit
of investment.
2.3.3 The Banker￿ s Problem
The problem of the banker is very similar to that of the entrepreneur. The banker takes
prices as given and chooses net claims holdings, non-negative consumption and investment,



















































b for each s 2 S; (14)










b for each s 2 S: (15)
The constraints (12)-(14) are to be interpreted analogously to (7)-(9) for the entrepreneur,
with the principle exception that the banker has no need of additional funding at date 1, and
instead may obtain goods at that date by liquidating a portion of his project. The incentive
10compatibility constraint (15) is derived and interpreted analogously to (10):
The marketable share of the banker￿ s project, ~ Rb := Rb ￿ ￿b; plays a role analogous to
that of the entrepreneur￿ s project as discussed in the previous subsection. The following as-
sumption implies that, for su¢ ciently large investment Ie (respectively, Ib), the entrepreneur
(banker) will be unable to credibly promise to repay Ie ￿ !e ￿
Ib ￿ !b￿
to outside creditors,
so that the entrepreneur (banker) will be unable to ￿nance an arbitrarily high amount of
investment.












for all liquidation rules ￿
e 2 [0;1]; and the marketable share of the banker is less than one,
~ Rb < 1:
2.3.4 De￿nition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is an allocation fc;n;I;￿;B;qg of consumption, labor, investment, liqui-
dation policies, net assets holdings, and asset prices such that (i) each agent￿ s problem is
solved; and (ii) the markets for contingent claims to consumption clear at dates 0 and 1,




It is easy to see that each agent￿ s marginal rate of substitution of consumption at date
0 for consumption in state 1s is ￿s; and that of consumption in state 1s for consumption in
state 2s is 1. Therefore, I will refer to the price system de￿ned by q1s = ￿s and q2s = 1 for
each s as the fundamental one. As will be seen in the next section, this price system need
not support an equilibrium.
The following assumption implies that the liquidity shock to the entrepreneur￿ s project
6The focus of the analysis to follow will be on the issue and purchase of claims by agents in the model.
Thus, I have de￿ned an equilibrium in terms of these markets, rather than those for goods. As usual,
imposition of goods market clearing conditions in the de￿nition of equilibrium instead of those for the claims
markets would lead to an equivalent concept.
11may induce a liquidity problem in the sense that the entrepreneur will need to hoard assets
in order to continue his project in the bad state.
Assumption 3. The marketable share of the entrepreneur is less than the additional
investment required in state 1H, ~ Re ￿ ￿ < 0:
3 Analysis
3.1 The Role of the Worker
Inspecting the worker￿ s problem, it is immediate that a ￿nite solution exists only if
q1s ￿ ￿s and q2s ￿ 1: These properties are a manifestation of the worker￿ s in￿nite capacity
to purchase assets that yield a positive return. For example, if it were true that q1s < ￿s;
then the worker could pro￿t by converting an arbitrarily large amount of date 0 labor into
date 0 goods, and trading the date 0 goods for claims to state 1s consumption. Since none
of his constraints are violated by making x0 arbitrarily positive while setting x1s = ￿x0=q1s;
and since the net contribution of the scheme to his lifetime expected payo⁄is ￿1s=q1s￿1 > 0
per unit of net labor expended, the worker￿ s problem has no solution and there can be no
equilibrium.
On the other hand, there is no symmetric argument available that shows that q1s cannot
be higher than ￿s in equilibrium. To see why, use the ￿rst-order condition for cw
2s to derive
the complementary slackness condition q2scw
2s = cw




1s = ￿x1s + c
w
2s:
Now the participation constraints (5) imply that Bw
1s ￿ 0 for each s: Thus, whereas the
worker can buy assets to take advantage of a low price of date 1 consumption, his inability
to commit to supply future labor prohibits his issuing assets to take advantage of high
prices. The following proposition summarizes and extends these points. All of the proofs in
12the paper are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 If q is an equilibrium price system,then q1s ￿ ￿s and q2s ￿ 1 for each s:
Furthermore, there is an optimal policy for the worker with claims holdings Bw if and only
if the following hold for each s:
(i) Bw
1s ￿ 0 with equality if q1s > ￿s; and
(ii) Bw
2s ￿ 0 with equality if q2s > 1:
3.2 A Simple Special Case
In this subsection, I analyze the special case of the model in which the probability that
the additional investment by the entrepreneur will be necessary is one; that is ￿ = 1: This
case focuses attention immediately on the date 0 market of state 1H claims, which will
remain central to the analysis of the model more generally. In this setting, no agent will be
induced to liquidate a project, since (under perfect foresight) he could always do better by
simply reducing the scale of his investment ex ante. I take advantage of these simpli￿cations




H = 0 a priori, and by ignoring reference to the outcome of the
random process where there can be no confusion. For example, I will write q1 rather than
q1H; and I will write cb
1 instead of cb
1H: I do this in the present subsection only.
From the analysis of the previous subsection, it can be seen that the market return on two-
period saving is less than the return available to the banker on funds invested internally. That
is, R ￿ 1 < Rb; where R := (q1q2)
￿1 is the two-period interest rate, and the second inequality
follows from Assumption 1. In this environment, the banker will ￿nd it advantageous to
borrow as much as possible against project proceeds and apply all of his marketable lifetime
wealth toward investment.7 This means that his incentive compatibility constraint will bind,




1 ￿ q1q2 ~ Rb:
7These results are stated formally and proved for the general case in Lemma 1 below.
13To focus on the pattern of claims holdings adopted by the banker under equilibrium prices,















1 ￿ q1q2 ~ Rb: (17)
Interpretation is facilitated by de￿ning the expression ~ Rb
￿
1 ￿ ~ Rb=R
￿￿1
as the leverage ratio
of the banker. These equations show that, as the market interest rate, the rate demanded by
lenders, is reduced, the banker will issue more and more liabilities, the amount tending to
in￿nity as the market rate approaches the marketable share of the banker. Thus, any ￿nite
demand for liquid liabilities can be met by the supply of the banker for some R > ~ Rb.
In contrast to the role of the banker in the model, the entrepreneur￿ s need of liquidity at
date 2 implies that he will be a net buyer of claims at date 0. Since, as shown above, the
price of these claims may be higher than the fundamental price, the need of liquidity may
impinge upon the pro￿tability of the entrepreneur￿ s project in a non-fundamental way.
If the fundamental prices hold, then the entrepreneur will desire to invest as much in his
project as possible. This case leads him to behave as the banker does, consuming nothing
at dates 0 and 1, and taking the maximal amount of leverage against project proceeds by
setting date 2 consumption so that his incentive compatibility constraint binds. On the
other hand, if the price of future claims rises above fundamentals, then the entrepreneur will
desire to transfer as much of his future consumption to date 0 as possible for any given level
of investment. The principal di⁄erence between the two cases is that it may be optimal for
the entrepreneur to consume his endowment (rather than invest) at date 0 if the price of
liquidity is su¢ ciently high.
8The hypothesis of ￿equilibrium prices￿implies that the denominator in the expressions on the right-
hand sides of (16) and (17) must be positive. To see this, notice that the banker could ￿nance unlimited
consumption if 1 ￿ q1q2 ~ Rb were negative.
14These arguments imply that ce
1 = 0 and ce
2 = Ie￿e; and now the dates 1 and 2 budget
















Now from (17) and (19) it can be seen that q2 = 1 in equilibrium; for if not, then Proposition
1 implies that Bw
2 = 0; and
P
i Bi
2 < 0 contradicts the market clearing condition. In meeting
the liquidity need, the entrepreneur sells at date 1 the securities he purchases at date 0 for
capital goods. Thereafter, the worker holds all of the outstanding liabilities of the other two
agents, a position he will only accept if the price of claims is consistent with fundamentals.
On the other hand, because the entrepreneur is a net buyer of claims to date 1 goods (that
is, Be
1 ￿ 0); the market for such claims may not clear at the fundamental price. This can
be seen more easily by looking at a reduced form of the entrepreneur￿ s problem. Solving the
entrepreneur￿ s budget constraints for date 0 consumption by eliminating his claims holdings





















￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿;
where the constraint inheres from the non-negativity of date 0 consumption. If the expres-
sion in square brackets in the objective function is positive, then each unit of investment
increases the payo⁄ of the entrepreneur, and he will invest the maximal amount allowed by
15the constraint. But this expression is non-positive for q1 ￿ ^ q; where
^ q :=
￿e ￿ 1
￿ ￿ ~ Re > 1;
and the inequality follows from Assumption 1 after some algebra. The next proposition is
the important corollary of this discussion.
Proposition 2 Suppose that additional investment by the entrepreneur is required with prob-
ability one. At equilibrium prices q; there is an optimal policy for the entrepreneur with claims



















￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿￿
for some ￿ 2 ￿(q1); where
￿(q1) :=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1; for q1 < ^ q
[0;1]; for q1 = ^ q
0; for q1 > ^ q:
It is intuitive to think of the amount of date 1 claims issued by the banker at date 0
(that is, the quantity ￿Bb
1) as the supply of liquidity. From (16) and the fact that q2 = 1 in
equilibrium, the supply of liquidity is given by
!b ~ Rb
1 ￿ q1 ~ Rb:
The family of broken curves in Figure 1 represent the supply of liquidity for di⁄erent values
of the banker￿ s date 0 endowment !b: The demand for liquidity is the entrepreneur￿ s holding












Figure 1: ￿Supply￿and ￿Demand￿of Liquidity for the Parameterization of Example 1
of date 1 claims given in Proposition 3; this is shown by the solid curve in the ￿gure.9
The supply and demand of liquidity represent a convenient device for characterizing the
equilibrium price of liquidity q1 as follows. First, if the curves do not intersect for some
q1 ￿ ￿ (= 1); then the supply of liquidity by the banker at the fundamental price exceeds
the demand of the entrepreneur; this is the case for the highest broken curve representing
the largest value of !b in the ￿gure. From Proposition 1, it is clear that the worker will be
able and willing to purchase excess liquid claims supplied by the banker at the fundamental
price q1 = 1; apparently, this is the equilibrium price in this case.
Next, if the curves intersect for some price between the fundamental price and ^ q, as they
do for the intermediate of the supply curves in the ￿gure, then the equilibrium exhibits a
liquidity price premium on liquid claims and no liquidation is required by the entrepreneur.
The price premium induces the banker to borrow more than he would under fundamental
prices, essentially subsidizing his investment. At the same time, the entrepreneur reduces
9The parameters used in the plot are those of the Example 1 below.
17investment relative to what he would choose otherwise, because the added price of providing
for the continuation of his project impinges on his ability to raise capital and invest. In this
case, the price premium dissuades the worker from purchasing any of these claims, and all
of the claims issued by the banker are purchased by the entrepreneur.
The third possibility is that the curves intersect at the price ^ q; as they do for the lowest
supply curve in the ￿gure. In this case, the entrepreneur is indi⁄erent with respect to
investment, and in equilibrium, he invests exactly the amount that can be continued at date
1 using the claims issued by the banker at this price. The investment of the entrepreneur is
!e￿=
h
1 + ^ q
￿
￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿i
; where ￿ is given implicitly by
!b ~ Rb
1 ￿ ^ q ~ Rb =
!e
￿
￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿
1 + ^ q
￿
￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿￿;
the equation of the liquidity supplied by the banker to the demand of the entrepreneur.
Example 1. The parameters used in the plot are Rb = 5
4; ￿b = 1; Re = 3; ￿e = 2; and ￿ = 3
2.
One can calculate that ~ Rb = 1
4; ~ Re = 1; and ^ q = 2: The endowment of the entrepreneur is




3.3 More General Cases
In this subsection, we explore the new possibilities that exist when the liquidity shock is
a random event. For simplicity, I will restrict the analysis by assuming that the probability
of the liquidity shock is low enough that the entrepreneur￿ s project may be pro￿tably un-
dertaken even when it will be fully liquidated in the bad state. Formally, I assume in the
remainder of the text that
(1 ￿ ￿)R
e ￿ 1 > 0: (20)
18This assumption is not necessary, but it simpli￿es the exposition without signi￿cant concep-
tual loss.10
With respect to investment at date 0, the motivation of the banker is little changed in the
general environment from that of the special case considered above. The restrictions derived
on equilibrium prices in subsection 3.1 imply that the private rate of return available from
investing will always exceed the market rate of interest, and the banker behaves optimally by
maximizing the size of his investment. The following lemma contains the formal statement
of this fact.
Lemma 1 At equilibrium prices, the banker will choose to consume nothing at dates 0 and
1, and he will choose date 2 consumption so that his incentive compatibility constraint is
binding in each state; that is, cb
0 = 0; and cb







Ib￿b for each s:
Under the assumption (20); we have eliminated the possibility that the entrepreneur may
be indi⁄erent about investment in equilibrium. The next lemma shows that the entrepreneur
invests all he can in the present case.
Lemma 2 Suppose that (20) holds. At equilibrium prices, the entrepreneur will choose to
consume nothing at dates 0 and 1, and he will choose date 2 consumption so that his incentive
compatibility constraint is binding in each state; that is, ce
0 = 0; and ce




s)Ie￿e for each s:
At an optimum under equilibrium prices q; Lemma 1 and the binding budget constraints

















10From the previous subsection, one can get the ￿ avor of the case excluded here. When ￿ is high (i.e.,
when (20) is violated) and as the price of liquidity rises, the entrepreneur will prefer to reduce his a priori
investment rather than liquidate his project after it is begun. In contrast, as will be seen, when (20) holds, he
will invest as much as possible and liquidate if necessary. In terms of the market for liquidity, the two modes
of behavior are qualitatively similar, since the liquid claims desired by the entrepreneur will be proportional
to the product of his investment and the fraction of the project that he will continue, Ie (1 ￿ ￿
e
H):
19It is easy to see that the denominator of this expression must be positive at equilibrium
prices for all feasible liquidation rules of the banker. If this were not the case, inspection of
the problem shows that a feasible policy exists that gives the banker any arbitrarily large
payo⁄. Intuitively, the liquid claims issued by the banker will be in proportion to his payo⁄,
so that any ￿nite demand for these claims can be met by the supply of the banker at a price
lower than that a⁄ording him in￿nite payo⁄.
Now using Lemma 1 and eliminating investment using (21); some algebra shows that the






























This objective function has a simple interpretation. The factor ￿b is the banker￿ s date 2
consumption per unit of residual (i.e., un-liquidated) investment at that date. The expression
in braces is the expectation over states of the residual investment, which can usefully be



















is the maximal ratio of investment to the banker￿ s initial endowment that is a⁄orded by
the incentive compatibility constraints, which is the leverage ratio of the banker. Therefore








; is the unconditional
expectation of the fraction of the banker￿ s project that will not be liquidated before date 2
under the chosen policy. Obviously, the banker gets no utility from liquidating a portion of
his project.
Under condition (20); the same logic can be applied to the case of the entrepreneur to










q2s ~ Re ￿ ￿s
￿; (23)
























The latter admits an interpretation similar to that for (22):
Before completing the characterization of optimal policies, it is useful to make the fol-
lowing observation.
Corollary 1 At equilibrium prices, it must be that q1L = 1 ￿ ￿ and q2s = 1 for each s:
The proof in the Appendix proceeds by showing that the extra-fundamental prices in any
market except that for state 1H claims must either violate market clearing or the result of
Proposition 1. In particular, in each market except that for claims in state 1H; both the
banker and the entrepreneur will be net issuers (negative claims holders). Therefore, the
relevant market clearing conditions imply that the claims holdings of the worker must be
positive for these markets, and then Proposition 1 shows that the fundamental prices must
prevail.
It is now possible to characterize the equilibrium with reference only to the market for
liquidity (that is, state 1H claims) by pinning down the price of liquidity q1H:For the banker,
one has the following.
Lemma 3 Suppose that q is an equilibrium price system.
1. If ~ Rb ￿ L then the banker will never liquidate his project in any state in equilibrium.
11Analogous to the case of the banker, in order for the entrepreneur￿ s problem to have a solution, the
denominator of the expression on the RHS must be positive for all ￿
e 2 [0;1]
2 ; therefore, equilibrium prices
must have this property.
212. If ~ Rb < L; then, in equilibrium, the banker will never liquidate his project in the good
state, but liquidation will occur in the bad state if the price of state 1H claims is high
enough. More precisely, the optimal liquidation policy for the banker has ￿
b
L = 0 and
￿
b




> > > > <
> > > > :
0; if q1H < qb
[0;1]; if q1H = qb




1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ~ Rb
L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ~ Rb￿:
It may be surprising that the banker would ever liquidate his project in this environment,
since he can always choose his investment and structure his claims portfolio so that it is not
necessary to do so. The key obviously lies in the condition that the marketable share of the
banker￿ s project must be less than its liquidation value for liquidation to be optimal. In this
case, the banker can raise more outside funds by promising to liquidate. Therefore, though
the banker gets no payo⁄ in the event, liquidation in the bad state allows him to increase
his investment. If the price of liquidity is high enough, the increased investment a⁄orded
may su¢ ciently increase his payo⁄ in the good state to compensate (in expectation) for the
sacri￿ce of any payo⁄ in the bad state. This result will be discussed at greater length in the
next section.
For the entrepreneur, the optimal liquidation policy abides the following.
Lemma 4 Assume that condition (20) holds. At equilibrium prices, the entrepreneur will
never liquidate his project in the good state, and there is a cuto⁄ level ￿ q > ￿ of the price
of liquidity such that liquidation is optimal in the bad state if and only if q1H ￿ ￿ q: More
22precisely, optimality has ￿
e
L = 0 and ￿
e




> > > > <
> > > > :
0; if q1H < ￿ q
[0;1]; if q1H = ￿ q
1; if q1H > ￿ q;
and
￿ q :=
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ~ Re
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿￿:



















the banker￿ s claims holding can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose that q is an equilibrium price system.
1. The banker will be a net issuer of claims in each state; that is, his holdings of claims
will be non-positive.
2. If the liquidation value of the banker￿ s project is no greater than its marketable share,
then his holdings of claims will be strictly negative and equal in each state; precisely, if




b (q1H;0) ~ R
b = ￿
!b ~ Rb
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + q1H) ~ Rb
for t 2 f0;1g and s 2 fH;Lg:
3. If the liquidation value of the banker￿ s project is greater than its marketable share,
then (i) his holdings of claims will be negative in state 1s for each s; and in state 2L;
but (ii) his state 2H holdings may re￿ect liquidation of a portion of his project and
retirement of liabilities. More precisely, there is an optimal policy for the banker with













































H 2 ￿b (q1H):
The following proposition characterizes the set of state 1H claims holdings that can be
optimal for the entrepreneur at equilibrium prices. This knowledge is all one needs to know
about the behavior of the entrepreneur in order to characterize the equilibrium prices. The
optimal state 1H claims holdings of the entrepreneur de￿ne his demand for liquidity.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (20) holds. At equilibrium prices, there is an optimal policy











￿ ￿ ~ Re
￿








H 2 ￿e (q1H):
Now the price of liquidity, the only element of the equilibrium price system that has
not been pinned down, may be characterized according to the algorithm described in the






for the banker￿ s issue of
claims when the equilibrium price is q1H and his optimal liquidation decision speci￿es that
he liquidate the share ￿
b



























Proposition 5 Suppose that (20) holds.
241. If the banker￿ s issue of liquid claims is at least as great as the entrepreneur￿ s demand
for them at the fundamental price, then this price supports an equilibrium without
liquidation by the entrepreneur. More precisely, if ￿
b (￿;0) + ￿
e (￿;0) ￿ 0; then in









2. If the banker￿ s issue of liquid claims is less than the entrepreneur￿ s demand for them
at the fundamental price, and the marketable share of the banker￿ s project is at least as
great as its liquidation value, then the equilibrium price of liquidity will be greater than
the fundamental price, and the entrepreneur may be required to liquidate a portion of
his project in the bad state. Precisely, if ￿
b (￿;0) + ￿
e (￿;0) > 0 and ~ Rb ￿ L; then q1H
uniquely satis￿es ￿
b (q1H;0) + ￿
e (q1H;￿
e
H) = 0 with ￿
e
H 2 ￿e (q1H):
3. If the banker￿ s issue of liquid claims is less than the entrepreneur￿ s demand for them
at the fundamental price, and the marketable share of the bankers project is less than
its liquidation value, then the equilibrium price of liquidity will be greater than the
fundamental price, and one or both of the producers may choose to liquidate a portion
of his project in the bad state. Precisely, if ￿
b (￿;0) + ￿
e (￿;0) > 0 and ~ Rb < L;









H) = 0 with ￿
b
H 2 ￿b (q1H) and
￿
e
H 2 ￿e (q1H):
Two additional examples are presented in the next section.
4 Discussion
4.1 Liquidity Provision and Output Across Sectors
The liquidity value of collateral securities has been investigated in varied environments
by Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998,2001) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1998, 2005). Holmstr￿m and
Tirole (1998), whose modeling devices I have essentially incorporated here, investigate (inter
25alia) the utility of a government bond to ameliorate the liquidity problem. In their model,
the supply of the liquid security is exogenous and perfectly elastic. In Kiyotaki and Moore
(1998, 2005), collateral is in ￿xed (perfectly inelastic) supply. Thus, each of these papers
abstracts from the topic of primary interest here, the elasticity of the supply of liquidity.
While each of these papers examines how liquidity problems a⁄ect ￿rms that experience
them, the important innovation of the present model is a theory of how liquidity may be
provided by the issue of liquid securities by ￿rms that do not. One implication is that, as
long as some ￿rms are una⁄ected, and as long as those ￿rms are capable of issuing fungible
securities, liquidity problems can have qualitatively di⁄erent e⁄ects in di⁄erent sectors. The
following example illuminates the possibility that some sector may be bene￿ted by such
episodes.
Example 2. Let Rb = 12
7 ; Re = 2; ￿b = ￿e = 8
7; ￿ = 8
7; ￿ = 1
4; !b = 2
7; !e = 5
7; and suppose
that L ￿ 4
7: Thus, ~ Rb = 4
7; ~ Re = 6
7; and ￿￿ ~ Re = 2
7: Note that (20) holds (the left-hand side
equals 1
2); and one can calculate that ￿ q = 5
12:






in his project. From Proposition 3 (part 2), it can be seen that his investment would be
￿nanced by his issue of 2
3 ￿ 4
7 = 0:381 claims for each state. At these prices, (23) and Lemma
















in his project. To ￿nance his investment, Proposition 4 shows that he would like to buy the
net amount 5
3 ￿ 2
7 = 0:476 claims for the bad state.
In the present example, the amount of claims desired by the entrepreneur exceeds the
26amount that would be issued by the banker at the fundamental prices. Since the worker is
precluded from issuing claims, the market equilibrium will therefore re￿ ect a premium price


























































> > > > <
> > > > :






[0;1]; if q1H = 5
12
1; if q1H > 5
12:
The solution has ￿
e
H = 0 and q1H = 5
14: The supply and demand curves for this market are
depicted in Figure 2, where the broken curve is ￿






H 2 ￿e (q1H):
In the equilibrium, the entrepreneur￿ s investment can be seen to be 14
9 ; less than he
would choose in an environment with surplus liquidity. On the other hand, the liquidity











to goods in each state. Thus, an interesting
feature of the model is illuminated: that the liquidity problem of the entrepreneur may
distort the banker￿ s behavior in the direction of increased investment.
4.2 Equilibrium Liquidation of the Banker￿ s Assets
In the model, liquidation of a project circumvents the need to provide incentives. There-
fore, even though the overall return from the project is lower when it is liquidated, it is still
possible that liquidation may put more value in the hands of outside claims holders than
could be achieved by carrying the project through to maturity. Indeed, Lemma 3 shows












Figure 2: Supply and Demand of Liquidity for the Parameterization in Example 2
that this is precisely the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the banker to be willing to
liquidate when the price of liquidity becomes extreme. In such an environment, his private
objective of expected payo⁄ maximization is served by selling state 1H claims based on the
liquidation value of his investment, rather than their value at maturity.
My last example illustrates this phenomenon numerically.
Example 3. Modify the example of the previous subsection by setting L = 6
7 > ~ Rb: In
this case, Lemma 3 shows that liquidation will be optimal for the banker whenever q1H is at
least qb = 1
3:
Figure 3 depicts the demand correspondence of the entrepreneur, analyzed in Example 2,
together with the implied supply correspondence of the banker with the higher liquidation
value. As is apparent from the ￿gure, the new equilibrium price is 1
3; which is lower than it
was in the previous example, and the banker now chooses to liquidate a small fraction of his
project in the bad state. More precisely, the fraction of the banker￿ s project to be liquidated




















































































Documenting the Savings and Loan Crisis in the U.S., White (1991) and others have
observed banks in ￿nancial distress ￿gambling for resurrection￿ by expanding their asset
portfolios beyond a prudent limit. While such behavior may at ￿rst appear to be related
to that described here, closer observation reveals important di⁄erences.12 In particular, the
environment described by these authors pre-supposes private information possessed by the
banks about the quality of their loan portfolios prior to the investment decision. Gambling
is then adverse to the interest of the holders of the banks￿liabilities. In the world described
12Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) o⁄er a good interpretation of the S&L Crisis in terms of economic theory.
29here, there is perfect information, and liquidation, when it occurs, represents a constrained
optimum.
A plausible historical analogy is that to episodes of liquidation by institutions under
the National Banking System of the nineteenth century. In that era, liquidity crises were
relatively frequent occurrences, and liquidation of banks￿assets often coincided with them.
This was true even while the crises did not necessarily a⁄ect the banks￿assets directly. The
closure of this analogy implies that, in times of the most severe crises, banks￿liabilities
did not garner su¢ cient faith that they could be circulated, and redemptions necessitated
asset liquidiations. Given the frequency and systematic nature of these crises, it seems likely
that the gamble of over-issue of liabilities by banks was undertaken consciously and widely
understood by other actors in the economy. That is, these lapses of faith seem to have been
anticipated ex ante.
4.3 Real Bills
The dual role of the banker in the model recalls the ￿real bills doctrine￿that private
￿nancial instruments backed by appropriate assets should be allowed to supplement other
media of exchange. The real bills doctrine holds that creation and circulation of ￿bills of
trade￿backed by the proceeds of commerce imparts a bene￿cial elasticity to the supply of
liquidity.
At the level of abstraction of the model, it is unclear whether the liabilities that provide
liquidity services in my model should be interpreted as bank deposits or simply corporate
debt. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) face a similar question in their paper. Comparing
the transactions velocity of bank deposits and corporate debt, they ￿nd unsupported the
empirical conclusion that corporate debt serves the role ascribed to the liquid liabilities in
their model. But the users of the liquidity services in their model are consumers, whose needs
may not be comparable to those of the entrepreneur as modeled here. In other words, the
frequency of the liquidity shocks that a⁄ect corporations may be such that corporate debt is
30an appropriate instrument with which to meet those shocks. Moreover, it seems likely that
￿nancially savvy ￿rms would ￿nd access to the corporate debt market less an obstacle than
would ordinary consumers.
The models of currency elasticity of Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Champ, Smith and
Williamson (1996) each exhibit institutions in which money creation under laissez faire con-
ditions impart a bene￿cial elasticity to the supply of money. There is no scarcity of money
per se, because these models abstract from commitment frictions that might disqualify cer-
tain assets from serving as security for a note. In Sargent and Wallace, for example, each
intertemporal trading opportunity may be assumed to give rise to a risk-free bill of exchange
for the full value of the desired transaction. Allocations are never constrained by the quan-
tity of money that can be created, because the issue of a note is assumed to induce an
obligation that does not admit default. The model of the present paper contributes to the
understanding of the elasticity of the transactions medium by showing how, when contract-
ing frictions exist, valuable commercial opportunities may be missed due to a shortage of
liabilities suitable for circulation. Whereas money creation and credit creation are identical
in these other environments, my model implies an endogenous separation between the assets
and the liabilities of the banker even in a lassaiz faire setting.
4.4 Liquidity Supply and Balance Sheet E⁄ects
The e⁄ect of a reduction of the endowment of the banker on the market for liquidity
is evident by reference to the example in Subsection 3.2. In Figure 1, it is shown how the
decrease in !b shifts the liquidity supply curve down, increasing the equilibrium price of
liquidity. Thus, the rate of return on liquid assets, the reciprocal of the price of liquidity,
falls as the supply contracts due to a decrease in the banker￿ s endowment.
Without speci￿cally interpreting the banker in terms of the banking sector in the real
world, the model shows how sectors of the economy may be ￿nancially interdependent,
and how a shock to the balance sheet of one sector of the economy can spillover to a⁄ect
31investment in another. In particular, it does not seem necessary that the sector that issues
instruments of liquidity have a ￿special￿role in ￿nance, as real world banks undoubtedly
have. It is only necessary that that the value of the liabilities issued by ￿rms in this sector
o⁄er an appropriate hedge against shocks that a⁄ect another sector.
Of course, by interpreting the banker as a ￿bank￿ , the model implies a ￿nding comple-
mentary to the literature, following Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1997), that distinguishes between
shocks to banks￿capital and shocks to corporate balance sheets.13 And, while it remains an
empirical question the extent to which the liabilities of non-￿nancial corporations provide
these liquidity services to other corporations, it is clear that banks perform this function by
o⁄ering deposits and credit lines.
5 Conclusions
In the previous sections, I have presented a model of entrepreneurial ￿nance in which
a liquidity need is generated by the con￿ uence of two factors. First, moral hazard induces
a wedge between market and private valuations of an entrepreneur￿ s project. Second, the
project faces the possibility of a cost shock at a time when cash ￿ ow is low. In this case,
the entrepreneur will need to hoard liquid securities to avoid having to liquidate his still-
valuable project. In the model, all securities must be backed by productive assets; there is
no government, and the promises of workers can be reneged with impugnity.
The innovation of the paper comes through the introduction of a second entrepreneur,
whom I label the ￿banker￿ , whose project is not susceptible to the liquidity shock. It is shown
that the liabilities of the banker can provide the liquidity valued by the entrepreneur. In
this case, the supply of liquidity inherits the elasticity properties of the banker￿ s investment
project. The upward-sloping liquidity supply curve in my model stands in contrast to the
vertical one in Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and the horizontal one in Holmstr￿m and Tirole
(1998). When liquidity is scarce, the price of these liabilities is high, and the entrepreneur
13See also Santomero and Seater (2000) and Chen (2001).
32e⁄ectively subsidizes the investment of the banker in demanding them. Thus, cost volatility
(i.e., the prospect of a random liquidity shock) in one sector may a⁄ect investment in the
other sector bene￿cially.
The idea that the issue and circulation of liabilities backed by commercial projects facili-
tates production in other sectors recalls the ￿real bills doctrine￿of classical monetary theory.
Under this interpretation, the presence of moral hazard frictions o⁄ers an explanation for
scarcity of the liquid medium. As in the doctrine itself, it seems unnecessary that the issuers
of liquid claims be true ￿banks￿ , but only that their liabilities serve as a hedge against the
risks faced by another sector. The degree to which liabilities like corporate bonds serve the
function analogous to the liquid claims in the model remains an empirical question of some
interest.
6 Appendix: Proofs of the Results
Proof of Proposition 1. The result is obvious from the discussion in the text and
inspection of the ￿rst-order conditions of the worker￿ s problem.
Proof of Proposition 2. The result is obvious from the discussion in the text.




is a feasible policy, and suppose
that cb
0 = ￿ > 0: Now construct the alternative policy
￿




as follows. Let ~ cb
0 = 0;




sIb=~ Ib and ~ cb
2s = cb
2s+￿Rb for each s: Let the remaining elements of
the new policy be identical to the old. Now it is easy to check that the new policy is feasible
if the old one is. Moreover, subtracting the payo⁄ under the old policy from that generated




> 0; so that the new one is an improvement, a contradiction.















33for some ￿ > 0: Now construct the alternative policy
￿




as follows. Let ~ Ib =




sIb=~ Ib for each s; and let ~ cb
2￿ = cb
2￿ ￿ ￿ + q1￿q2￿￿Rb and ~ cb
2s =
cb
2s + q1￿q2￿￿Rb for s 6= ￿: Let the remaining elements of the new policy be identical to the
old. Now it is easy to check (using q1￿q2￿ ￿ ￿￿) that the new policy is feasible if the old one













Finally, suppose that the feasible policy has cb
1￿ = ￿ > 0: Then construct the tilde policy
with ~ cb




sIb=~ Ib; and ~ cb
2s = cb
2s +q1￿Rb; and let the other elements
be as in the original policy. Again the feasibility and superiority of the new policy can be
veri￿ed.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that (ce;Ie;￿
e;Be) is a feasible policy, and that ce
0 = ￿ > 0:
Construct an alternative policy
￿




as follows. Let ~ ce
0 = 0; ~ ce
2L = ce
2L + ￿Re;




L=~ Ie; and ~ ￿
e
H = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
e
H)Ie=~ Ie: De￿ne the remaining elements of
the new policy as in the old. Now it is easy to check that the new policy is feasible if the
old one is. Moreover, subtracting the payo⁄ to the entrepreneur of the old policy from that
generated by the new one gives
￿[(1 ￿ ￿)R
e ￿ 1] > 0;
where the inequality follows from (20):
(Surpluses for the other states can be excluded in the manner of the proof of Lemma 1.)
Proof of Corollary 1. From the budget constraints of the banker, one has the following


























(The strict inequality follows from the fact that Ib > 0:) Suppose by way of contradiction
that q1L > 1 ￿ ￿: It is immediate from Proposition 1 that Bw
1L = 0; and from the budget











1L < 0; contradicting the market clearing conditions. Thus, it must be that
q1L = 1 ￿ ￿:
Next suppose that q2s > 1; then Proposition 1 gives Bw
2s = 0; and from the budget




e (1 ￿ ￿
e
s) ~ R
e ￿ 0: (24)
Since Bi
2s ￿ 0; i 2 fb;eg; market clearing implies that Bi
2s = 0 for i 2 fb;eg: Since Ib > 0;
this implies that ￿
b
s = 1: From the ￿rst-order (n.s.) conditions for (22); it is straightforward
to show that ￿
b
s > 0 only if q1￿ > ￿￿ for some ￿ 2 fH;Lg:14 Suppose ￿rst that ￿ = s; that is,
q1s > ￿s: Then Proposition 1 gives Bw
1s = 0; so that Be
1s = ￿Bb
1s > 0: Now from the budget












and it must be that Ie (1 ￿ ￿
e
s) > 0: But now (24) contradicts the implication shown above
14Writing the Kuhn-Tucker condition for ￿
b
s and plugging in q1￿ = ￿￿ for each ￿, the criterion reduces to
L ￿ 1; this quantity is always negative, implying that ￿
b
s = 0 by the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
35that Be
2s = 0:
Next suppose that ￿ is not the same as s: Again Proposition 1 gives that Bw
1￿ = 0; and
Ie (1 ￿ ￿
e
￿) > 0: This implies that the entrepreneur liquidates his project in the good state,
which can easily be seen (e.g., from the ￿rst-order conditions for the problem) to contradict
optimality.
Proof of Lemma 3. The necessary and su¢ cient ￿rst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions for































￿ 0 if ￿
b
￿ > 0
￿ 0 if ￿
b
￿ < 1;
where I have imposed the result of Corollary 1 that q2s = 1 in equilibrium. I have already
argued that the term in braces must be positive for all ￿
b 2 [0;1]
2 at equilibrium prices, so
result 1 is obvious by inspection.
Now consider the case that ~ Rb < L: using the result of Corollary 1 that q1L = 1 ￿ ￿; the
critical condition for ￿
b














1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)L ￿ ￿
￿













￿ ~ Rb ;
and that for ￿
b


























































H = 1: But inspection of the
15To show this, ￿rst show that QL is decreasing in ￿
b















￿ QH (1) ￿ QL (0): Then evaluating the RHS, it is easy to see that it must be negative.

















Thus, it cannot be that ￿
b
L > 0 in equilibrium, proving the ￿rst part of result 2: Now
evaluating QH (0), the critical condition for ￿
b
H > 0 can be restated as q1H ￿ qb; and the
optimality of the rule ￿
b
H 2 ￿b (q1H) follows directly.
Proof of Lemma 4. The function to be maximized by ￿
e is strictly quasiconcave, so that
the ￿rst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for optimality. Using the

























￿ 0 if ￿
e
￿ > 0
￿ 0 if ￿
e
￿ < 1:
I have already argued that the expression in square brackets is positive, so that ￿L = 0
implies immediately that ￿
e
L = 0: Imposing this result in the condition for ￿
b
H and using the
fact that q1L = 1 ￿ ￿ (Corollary 1), the cuto⁄ price ￿ q may be derived by simplifying and
solving for the value of q1H that makes the left-hand side criterion exactly equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows easily from the banker￿ s budget constraints
in light of previous results.
Proof of Proposition 4. The result follows easily from the entrepreneur￿ s budget con-
straints, equation (23), and Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. The result follows from the previous ones and the de￿nition of
equilibrium.
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